Are declarative sentences representational?

Mind 107 (425):33-58 (1998)
We call a semantic theory 'classical' if it includes the assertions that (I) a function V assigning semantic value maps object language proper names into some set D, (ii) V maps object language atomic sentences into some set F, and (iii) the extension of any object language unary predicate is a member of the power set of D. Two theorems can be proven which assert that any classical theory which includes certain other assumptions assigns the same member of F to every true object language sentence. Many accept the following argument: (1) every plausible semantic theory is classical and contains the assertions named in the theorems, (2) if the semantic value of declarative sentences is a representation or representational then, some different true sentences differ in what they represent, hence, declarative sentences are not representational. I show how to avoid the conclusion by arguing for the falsity of (1).
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DOI 10.1093/mind/107.425.33
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