Authors
Caitrin Donovan
University of Sydney
Dominic Murphy
University of Sydney
Abstract
De Haan has provided a novel and distinctly enactivist solution to the problem of integrating the physiological, experiential, social and existential. We admire her articulation of her fourth "existential" dimension. Not only does it represent a real attempt to bridge, as she says, enactivism's explanatory gap, it is also a potentially useful construct for conceptualizing the way that self-reflexivity seems to go astray in much psychopathology. We think that pinpointing this phenomenon is something that phenomenological accounts excel at. We have, however, two key reservations about her account, which we outline.To begin with, we are unsure that there is any particular scientific research program that derives from...
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DOI 10.1353/ppp.2020.0003
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