Philosophical Studies 154 (1):27 - 51 (2011)

Maureen Donnelly
State University of New York, Buffalo
In this paper, I focus on three issues intertwined in current debates between endurantists and perdurantists—(i) the dimension of persisting objects, (ii) whether persisting objects have timeless, or only time-relative, parts, and (iii) whether persisting objects have proper temporal parts. I argue that one standard endurantist position on the first issue is compatible with standard perdurantist positions on parthood and temporal parts. I further argue that different accounts of persistence depend on the claims about objects' dimensions and not on the auxiliary claims about parthood and temporal parts
Keywords Persistence  Endurantism  Perdurantism  Three-dimensionalism  Four-dimensionalism  Temporal parts  Parthood
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9526-z
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Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Multiple Location Defended.Antony Eagle - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2215-2231.
Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.

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