Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):283-287 (2014)

Tom Donaldson
Simon Fraser University
Hartry Field has argued that mathematical realism is epistemologically problematic, because the realist is unable to explain the supposed reliability of our mathematical beliefs. In some of his discussions of this point, Field backs up his argument by saying that our purely mathematical beliefs do not ‘counterfactually depend on the facts’. I argue that counterfactual dependence is irrelevant in this context; it does nothing to bolster Field's argument
Keywords platonism  mathematical realism  reliability  sensitivity  counterfactuals  Benacerraf  Field
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.143
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References found in this work BETA

Realism, Mathematics and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon E. Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687-701.

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