Three Problems with Metaethical Minimalism

Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1):125-131 (2018)
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Metaethical minimalism. sometimes called quietism, is the view that first-order moral judgments can be true but nothing makes them true. This article raises three worries for that view. First, minimalists have no good reason to insist that moral judgments can be true. Second, minimalism, in abandoning the requirement that true judgments need to have truthmakers, leads to a problematic proliferation of truths. Third, most versions of minimalism entail a disjointed and therefore unacceptable theory of language and thought.



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Raff Donelson
Illinois Institute of Technology

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Ethical Pragmatism.Raff Donelson - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):383-403.

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