Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1):125-131 (2018)

Raff Donelson
Pennsylvania State University
Metaethical minimalism. sometimes called quietism, is the view that first-order moral judgments can be true but nothing makes them true. This article raises three worries for that view. First, minimalists have no good reason to insist that moral judgments can be true. Second, minimalism, in abandoning the requirement that true judgments need to have truthmakers, leads to a problematic proliferation of truths. Third, most versions of minimalism entail a disjointed and therefore unacceptable theory of language and thought.
Keywords metaethics  quietism  Richard Rorty  Hilary Putnam  alethic pluralism  truthmakers  T. M. Scanlon
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ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview201834113
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References found in this work BETA

Ethical Pragmatism.Raff Donelson - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):383-403.

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Citations of this work BETA

Whose Metaethical Minimalism?Noell Birondo - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):37-43.
Metaethical Minimalism: A Demarcation, Defense, and Development.Aaron Franklin - 2020 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Cruz

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