Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1077-1095 (2019)

Ryan Doody
Brown University
Let’s say that you regard two things as on a par when you don’t prefer one to other and aren’t indifferent between them. What does rationality require of you when choosing between risky options whose outcomes you regard as on a par? According to Prospectism, you are required to choose the option with the best prospects, where an option’s prospects is a probability-distribution over its potential outcomes. In this paper, I argue that Prospectism violates a dominance principle—which I call The Principle of Predominance—because it sometimes requires you to do something that’s no better than the alternatives and might be worse. I argue that this undermines the strongest argument that’s been given in favor of Prospectism.
Keywords Decision Theory  Parity  Incomplete Preferences  Dominance
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1048-0
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References found in this work BETA

Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Take the Sugar.Caspar Hare - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):237-247.

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Citations of this work BETA

Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.
The Hard Problem of Intertheoretic Comparisons.Jennifer Rose Carr - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.

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