Bayesian personalism, the methodology of scientific research programmes, and Duhem's problem

Abstract
The detailed analysis of a particular quasi-historical numerical example is used to illustrate the way in which a Bayesian personalist approach to scientific inference resolves the Duhemian problem of which of a conjunction of hypotheses to reject when they jointly yield a prediction which is refuted. Numbers intended to be approximately historically accurate for my example show, in agreement with the views of Lakatos, that a refutation need have astonishingly little effect on a scientist's confidence in the ‘hard core’ of a successful research programme even when a comparable confirmation would greatly enhance that confidence . Timeo Danaos et dona ferentis
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DOI 10.1016/0039-3681(79)90006-2
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Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231.
The Crux of Crucial Experiments: Duhem's Problems and Inference to the Best Explanation.Marcel Weber - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):19-49.

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