Contingent Existence and Iterated Modality

Analysis 77 (1):155-165 (2017)
Authors
Cian Dorr
New York University
Abstract
A discussion of a view, defended by Robert Adams and Boris Kment, according to which contingent existence requires rejecting many standard principles of propositional modal logic involving iterated modal operators.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anw071
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Actualism and Thisness.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):3-41.

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