Collingwood's solution to the problem of mind-body dualism

Philosophia 32 (1-4):349-368 (2005)
This paper contrasts two approaches to the mind-body problem and the possibility of mental causation: the conceptual approach advocated by Collingwood/Dray and the metaphysical approach advocated by Davidson. On the conceptual approach to show that mental causation is possible is equivalent to demonstrating that mentalistic explanations possess a different logical structure from naturalistic explanations. On the metaphysical approach to show that mental causation is possible entails explaining how the mind can intelligibly be accommodated within a physicalist universe. I argue that the conceptual approach offers a much more powerful defence of the autonomy of the mental
Keywords Dualism  Metaphysics  Mind-body  Physicalism  Supervenience  Collingwood, Robin George
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1007/BF02641630
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