Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):273-282 (2014)

Authors
Kevin Dorst
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
The Knowledge Norm of Assertion claims that it is proper to assert that p only if one knows that p. Though supported by a wide range of evidence, it appears to generate incorrect verdicts when applied to utterances of “I don't know.” Instead of being an objection to KNA, I argue that this linguistic data shows that “I don't know” does not standardly function as a literal assertion about one's epistemic status; rather, it is an indirect speech act that has the primary illocutionary force of opting out of the speaker's conversational responsibilities. This explanation both reveals that the opt-out is an under-appreciated type of illocutionary act with a wide range of applications, and shows that the initial data in fact supports KNA over its rivals
Keywords opt‐out  “I don't know”  Pyrrhonian skepticism  indirect speech acts  knowledge norm of assertion
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1002/tht3.142
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Innocent Implicatures.Alexander Dinges - 2015 - Journal of Pragmatics 87:54-63.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

In What Sense is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
Knowledge Norms.Matthew A. Benton - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:nn-nn.
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):653-658.
Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory.John Turri - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.
What Assertion Doesn't Show.Conor McHugh - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.
Irksome Assertions.Rachel McKinnon & John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.
Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-11-27

Total views
130 ( #73,949 of 2,404,066 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #45,505 of 2,404,066 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes