Analysis 81 (4):611-621 (2022)
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| Abstract |
Many have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a claim, it might also provide evidence against it. Similarly, many have claimed that your credence should never be on the edge of the range of credences that you think might be rational. Surprisingly, both of these principles imply that you cannot rationally be modest: you cannot be uncertain what the rational opinions are.
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| Keywords | higher-order uncertainty reflection principles intentionally biased inquiry epistemic modesty probabilistic epistemic logic |
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| DOI | 10.1093/analys/anab003 |
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
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