Embedding Epistemic Modals

Mind 122 (488):867-914 (2013)
Abstract
Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and it might not be raining, … ’ sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and I don’t know it, … ’. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. This paper develops an explanation of the puzzling facts about embedding within an orthodox framework
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzt091
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Zif is If.David Barnett - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):519-566.
Simple 'Might's, Indicative Possibilities and the Open Future.K. DeRose - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):67-82.

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Citations of this work BETA
Belief is Weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
An Update on Epistemic Modals.Malte Willer - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):835–849.
Epistemic Modals and Sensitivity to Contextually‐Salient Partitions.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):134-146.

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