Four conceptions of the hard problem of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):129-44 (2015)

Authors
Jonathan Eric Dorsey
Texas Tech University
Abstract
Though widely discussed, the hard problem of consciousness (‘the hard problem’ hereafter) is surprisingly difficult to pin down. In fact, one may see that not just a couple of plausible conceptions of the problem exist but rather four do. After providing some background for the hard problem, I present and clarify these four conceptions of it. I close by providing some key considerations for and against each of the four conceptions without passing final judgment on any of them. Ultimately, though, we do need to come to a resolution in so far as one is possible.
Keywords hard problem  consciousness  physicalism  dualism  anti-physicalism  eliminativism
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 44,283
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness.Bernard Molyneux - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.
Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - forthcoming - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, USA: Routledge.
There is No Hard Problem of Consciousness.Kieron O'Hara & Tom Scutt - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):290-302.
Giving Up on the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Eugene Mills - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.
What Mary’s Aboutness Is About.Martina Fürst - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.
Real Acquaintance and Physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-02-19

Total views
93 ( #88,476 of 2,271,014 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #267,426 of 2,271,014 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature