Abstract

The chief task of this dissertation is to show that G. E. Moore's work on skepticism, circa 1903-1942, has been undervalued. A careful examination of his arguments and strategies shows that they are more powerful, collectively, than is usually thought. I undertake such an examination in this dissertation. I argue that Moore made a considerable advance in our understanding or the problem of skepticism, and of how to solve it. ;I take Moore's arguments to divide into four interrelated categories. First, I examine Moore's use of common sense in his arguments, and compare this concept with what is normally meant by "common sense". I argue that Moore's appeal to common sense differs from garden variety common sense, but that, nonetheless, the common sense views he articulates serve as the philosophical underpinnings of plain common sense. I also examine the ways in which skepticism runs afoul of common sense. ;Second, I argue that the skeptic is guilty of a peculiar kind of inconsistency in what he asserts and what he implies by his other asserting and non-linguistic behavior. I apply Robert Brandom's theory of the conditions of assertability to explain what goes wrong in "Moore's Paradox" sentences. I argue that proof of such inconsistencies is highly damaging to the skeptic's position. ;Third, I give an analysis of the connections between various kinds of possibility, with a focus on epistemic and logical possibility. I examine Moore's descriptive and normative uses of the expressions "possible", "logically possible", "might have been", and "p is contingent", with an emphasis on how the skeptic conflates kinds of possibility in order to complete key arguments for his position. ;Finally I look to Moore's notorious proofs, and investigate the nature of the burden of proof. I argue that Moore succeeds in shifting the burden of proof to the skeptic, and in so doing, more than salvages his position from what looks, to some, like defeat