Global justice and the limits of human rights

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):562–581 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

To a great extent, recent discussion of global obligations has been couched in the language of human rights. I argue that this is a mistake. If, as many theorists have supposed, a normative theory applicable to obligations of global justice must also respect the needs of justice internal to recipient nations, any such theory cannot take human rights as an important moral notion. Human rights are inapplicable for the domestic justice of poor nations, and thus cannot form a plausible basis for international justice. Instead, I propose an alternative basis, a form of welfarist maximizing consequentialism. My alternative is superior to rights-based theories in dealing with the special problems of justice found in poor nations

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
104 (#172,830)

6 months
12 (#243,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas

Citations of this work

On the Cogency of Human Rights.Katrin Flikschuh - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (1):17-36.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Equality as a moral ideal.Harry Frankfurt - 1987 - Ethics 98 (1):21-43.
Equality, priority, and compassion.Roger Crisp - 2003 - Ethics 113 (4):745-763.

Add more references