How to Be a Modal Realist

Abstract

This paper investigates the form a modal realist analysis of possibility and necessity should take. It concludes that according to the best version of modal realism, the notion of a world plays no role in the analysis of modal claims. All contingent claims contain some de re element; the effect of modal operators on these elements is described by a counterpart theory which takes the same form whether the de re reference is to a world or to something else. This fully general counterpart theory can validate orthodox modal logic, including the logic of 'actually'.

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Cian Dorr
New York University

Citations of this work

Quantification and Epistemic Modality.Dilip Ninan - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):433-485.
Self‐Location and Other‐Location.Dilip Ninan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):301-331.
Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals.Boris Kment - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):573-609.
Necessity First.Alastair Wilson - 2022 - Argumenta 14.

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References found in this work

Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 12 (1):109-110.
Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford University Press.

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