Idealism and the philosophy of mind


Authors
Giuseppina D'Oro
Keele University
Abstract
This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda
Keywords Functionalism  Idealism  Metaphysics  Mind  Monism  Reductivism  Collingwood, Robin George  Davidson, Donald  Kim, Jaegwon
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DOI 10.1080/00201740500241847
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.

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Citations of this work BETA

Fichte’s Critique of Physicalism – Towards an Idealist Alternative.Plato Tse - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (5):527-545.
Fichte’s Critique of Physicalism – Towards an Idealist Alternative.Plato Tse - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (5):527-545.

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