Authors
Fabian Dorsch
Université de Fribourg
Abstract
In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences of this conclusion, especially for the issue of whether imagination can help us to learn something from fictions.
Keywords imagination  imaginative experience  sensory imagination  visualising  auditory imagination  basing relation  factual knowledge
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemic Status of the Imagination.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
Reference in Fiction.Stacie Friend - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (54):179-206.
Remembering the Past and Imagining the Actual.Daniel Munro - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2).

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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