Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):660-682 (2013)

Authors
Fabian Dorsch
Université de Fribourg
Abstract
In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non‐inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower‐level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non‐inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited to only some of their lower‐level features that realise their higher‐level aesthetic qualities. Although my concern with the view that aesthetic judgements are subject to non‐inferential justification is very general, my discussion is primarily structured around Sibley's well‐developed and influential version of this view.
Keywords aesthetic judgement  non-inferentialism  inferentialism  justification  reasons  criticism  aesthetic experience  aesthetic perception  Sibley
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.12063
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References found in this work BETA

Categories of Art.Kendall L. Walton - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):334-367.
Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic.Frank Sibley - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (2):135-159.
Aesthetic Principles.Oliver Conolly & Bashshar Haydar - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):114-125.

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