Noûs 36 (1):97–103 (2002)

Authors
Cian Dorr
New York University
Abstract
Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises.
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0068.00362
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Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Recent Work in Expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):136-147.

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