Noûs 36 (1):97–103 (2002)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/1468-0068.00362 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Prospects for an Expressivist Theory of Meaning.Nate Charlow - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15:1-43.
Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
View all 25 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
How Not to Avoid Wishful Thinking.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation.Michael Smith - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.
Noncognitivism and Wishfulness.James Lenman - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):265-274.
Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
Expressivism and Moral Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
306 ( #27,074 of 2,419,962 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #56,761 of 2,419,962 )
2009-01-28
Total views
306 ( #27,074 of 2,419,962 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #56,761 of 2,419,962 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads