On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract

Theory and Decision 43 (3):219-239 (1997)

This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents a real alternative to a utilitarian solution
Keywords Social contract  maximin principle  game theory  Arrow problem  social justice  Rawls
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1004948310616
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,566
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction.Ken Binmore - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Explaining Fairness in Complex Environments.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):81-97.
Reciprocity and the Social Contract.Ken Binmore - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (1):5-35.
'Testing' Game Theory.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2):211-223.
Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?Cedric Paternotte & Jonathan Grose - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):551-587.
The Roles of Stories in Applying Game Theory.Till Grüne‐Yanoff & Paul Schweinzer - 2008 - Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (2):131-146.


Added to PP index

Total views
72 ( #101,525 of 2,325,500 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #94,198 of 2,325,500 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature