Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: why the Unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second

Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):25-41 (2012)
Abstract
The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about “what there is”. In this respect, I will conclude that also the debate about persistence in time has no ontological consequences, in the sense that there is no real ontological disagreement between the two allegedly opposite positions: as in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate, one can be both a perdurantist and an endurantist, depending on which linguistic framework is preferred
Keywords Metaphysics of time  Eternalism, endurantism  Persistence, Identity  presentism, perdurantism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3196/003180212800605257
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Endurantism and Paradox.Paul Richard Daniels - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1173-1179.
Occupy Wall: A Mereological Puzzle and the Burdens of Endurantism.Paul Richard Daniels - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):91-101.
The Burning Fuse Model of Unbecoming in Time.John D. Norton - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part A):103-105.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-02-23

Total downloads
499 ( #5,405 of 2,268,078 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #9,397 of 2,268,078 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature