Reply to Professor Brinton
Religious Studies 21 (1):91 - 92 (1985)
Abstract
In my paper, ‘Agnosticism’, I asked the reader to consider the following three propositions. There is more evidence for theism than for atheism. There is more evidence for atheism than for theism. There is roughly the same amount of evidence for both. And I claimed that if it is not known which of to is true, then theism, atheism and agnosticism are all equally rational positions. As against that claim, Professor Brinton cites the following epistemic principle: When the state of the evidence on some question ‘p?’ is uncertain, suspension of belief is the most appropriate doxastic attitude . However, my paper contained the seeds of a refutation of this principle. I wrote there that the agnosticDOI
10.1017/s0034412500016917
My notes
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