Reply to Professor Brinton

Religious Studies 21 (1):91 - 92 (1985)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In my paper, ‘Agnosticism’, I asked the reader to consider the following three propositions. There is more evidence for theism than for atheism. There is more evidence for atheism than for theism. There is roughly the same amount of evidence for both. And I claimed that if it is not known which of to is true, then theism, atheism and agnosticism are all equally rational positions. As against that claim, Professor Brinton cites the following epistemic principle: When the state of the evidence on some question ‘p?’ is uncertain, suspension of belief is the most appropriate doxastic attitude . However, my paper contained the seeds of a refutation of this principle. I wrote there that the agnostic



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,953

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reply to professor Baker.Clement Dore - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (3):251 - 255.
Reply to Brinton.Alan Millar - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):486-491.
Reply to Professor Brender and Professor Byrne.Phillip Cole - 2002 - Social Philosophy Today 18:197-206.
I. mathematical modeling of election predictions: Final reply to professor Aubert.Herbert A. Simon - 1983 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):231 – 232.
Social contracts and corporations: A reply to Hodapp. [REVIEW]Thomas Donaldson - 1990 - Journal of Business Ethics 9 (2):133 - 137.
A Reply to Professor Rowe.Clement Dore - 1986 - Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):314-318.
Alter et etiam: Rejoinder to Schepers.Marcelo Dascal - 2004 - The Leibniz Review 14:137-151.
Reply to professor Fetzer.D. H. Mellor - 1978 - Philosophia 7 (3-4):661-666.
Reply to professor körner.J. W. N. Watkins - 1960 - Mind 69 (275):406-407.
Reply to professor Marcus.W. V. Quine - 1961 - Synthese 13 (4):323 - 330.


Added to PP

36 (#457,152)

6 months
20 (#138,999)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references