Think 15 (42):35-52 (2016)

In the first section of this paper, I discuss a quantum mechanical account, which is endorsed by the MIT physicist, Alan Guth, of the origin of what Guth believes to have been an absolutely first universe. I argue that, though his explanation is unsound, there is no reason to think that it needs to be replaced by a supernaturalist one. In the second section, I argue that though Professor Steven Weinberg's tentative explanation of the apparent fine-tuning of the cosmological constant is unacceptable, we need not accept a supernaturalist account of the coming about of intelligent life
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s1477175615000160
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,634
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Miracles and Science: Mora Than a Miraculous Relationship.Yiftach J. H. Fehige - 2012 - Toronto Journal of Theology 28 (1):159-163.
Probability, Explanation, and Reasoning.Roger Lewis White - 2000 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Why Cosmic Fine-Tuning Needs to Be Explained.Neil Alan Manson - 1998 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
Ethical Supernaturalism.Clement Dore - 1976 - Sophia 15 (3):19-25.
Refined and Crass Supernaturalism: T. L. S. Sprigge.T. L. S. Sprigge - 1992 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 32:105-125.
Astrophysical Fine Tuning, Naturalism, and the Contemporary Design Argument.Mark A. Walker & M. Milan - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):285 – 307.


Added to PP index

Total views
39 ( #248,944 of 2,348,924 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #330,968 of 2,348,924 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes