Preferences, welfare, and the status-quo bias

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554 (2010)
Abstract
Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias
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DOI 10.1080/00048400903225130
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.L. W. Sumner - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.
Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 2006 - In Aloysius Martinich, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Early Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA
Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.
Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.

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