Preferences, welfare, and the status-quo bias

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554 (2010)

Authors
Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas
Abstract
Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias
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DOI 10.1080/00048400903225130
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 2006 - In Aloysius Martinich, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Early Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA

Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.
Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
Subjectivism Without Desire.D. Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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