True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defence of Evidentialism

Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):4-28 (2021)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Is it good to form positive beliefs about those you have faith in, such as God or a religious community? Doxastic partialists say that it is. Some hold that it is good, from the viewpoint of faith, to form positive beliefs about the object of your faith even when your evidence favours negative ones. Others try to maintain respect for evidence by appealing to a highly permissive epistemology. I argue against both forms of doxastic partiality, on the grounds that they foster an epistemically problematic noetic entrenchment. I instead defend evidentialism—the view that it is good to strive for true beliefs about the object of your faith, be they positive or negative, given relatively stringent evidential norms. I address the objection that evidentialism fosters disloyalty to the other party, not least because it risks losing your faith altogether. What emerges are not just epistemic norms for beliefs about religious matters, but an evidentialist account of what makes for good faith itself.

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Katherine Dormandy
University of Innsbruck

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Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.

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