Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):173-196 (2011)

Authors
Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that hedonism about well-being faces a powerful dilemma. However, as I shall try to show here, this choice creates a dilemma for hedonism. On a subjective interpretation, hedonism is open to the familiar objection that pleasure is not the only thing desired or the only thing for which we possess a pro-attitude. On an objective interpretation, hedonism lacks an independent rationale. In this paper, I do not claim that hedonism fails once and for all. However, this dilemma illustrates a serious problem for hedonism, the solution to which is not immediately obvious, and which must be addressed if hedonism is to be considered a serious competitor for the true theory of well-being
Keywords hedonism  welfare  well-being
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DOI 10.1163/174552411X563240
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References found in this work BETA

Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
Hedonism Reconsidered.Roger Crisp - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
Subjectivism Without Desire.D. Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.

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