The phenomenology of attitudes and the salience of rational role and determination

Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):114-137 (2016)
Abstract
The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, namely the rational role that they play in our mental lives and their determination by factors external to them, such as external objects or reasons. In particular, I aim to defend Phenomenal Rationalism about judgemental thoughts and perceptual experiences: the view that their phenomenal character reflects their rational role, that is, their capacity to provide and/or respond to reasons. I conclude with some remarks about how this view may be extended to other kinds of th...
Keywords phenomenology of attitudes  cognitive phenomenology  attitudinal phenomenology  judgement  thought  perception  reasons  rational motivation
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2016.1176231
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.

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