Why Rational People Polarize

The Phenomenal World (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that several of the psychological tendencies that drive polarization could arise from purely rational mechanisms, due to the fact that some types of evidence are predictably more ambiguous than others.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.
Adaptive Rationality, Biases, and the Heterogeneity Hypothesis.Andrea Polonioli - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):787-803.
Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality.Alan Millar - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198.
Rationality and higher-order intentionality.Alan Millar - 2001 - Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
The Ethics of Argumentation.Vasco Correia - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (2):222-241.
The Rationalities of Emotion.Cecilea Mun - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind 2017 (11):48-57.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-01

Downloads
590 (#28,046)

6 months
93 (#40,417)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kevin Dorst
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.
The Epistemic Aims of Democracy.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (11):e12941.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references