Erkenntnis 62 (1):47 - 69 (2004)
To save antirealism from Fitchs Paradox, Tennant has proposed to restrict the scope of the antirealist principle that all truths are knowable to truths that can be consistently assumed to be known. Although the proposal solves the paradox, it has been accused of doing so in an ad hoc manner. This paper argues that, first, for all Tennant has shown, the accusation is just; second, a restriction of the antirealist principle apparently weaker than Tennants yields a non-ad hoc solution to Fitchs Paradox; and third, the alternative is only apparently weaker than, and even provably equivalent to, Tennants. It is thereby shown that the latter is not ad hoc after all.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Logic Ontology|
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References found in this work BETA
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle.Martin Fischer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
Distributed Knowability and Fitch's Paradox.Rafał Palczewski - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):455--478.
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Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The New Paradox of the Stone Revisited.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (2):261-268.
Revamping the Restriction Strategy.Neil Tennant - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Fitch's Paradox and Ceteris Paribus Modalities.Carlo Proietti & Gabriel Sandu - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):75 - 87.
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