Ayn Rand and Deducing 'Ought' from 'Is'.

Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 12 (1):151-168 (2012)

Lachlan Doughney
University of Melbourne
The article discusses how and why philosopher Ayn Rand attempted to deduce an ought conclusion from only is premises. It contends that Rand did attempt to deduce what one ought and ought not do from what is or is not the case. It argues that Rand attempted to provide a universally objective unshakable normative moral claim, that people ought to act in accordance with her value and virtue system.
Keywords Ayn Rand  is ought problem  Deduction
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