Decision theory and the rationality of further deliberation

Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):303-328 (2002)
Bayesian decision theory operates under the fiction that in any decision-making situation the agent is simply given the options from which he is to choose. It thereby sets aside some characteristics of the decision-making situation that are pre-analytically of vital concern to the verdict on the agent's eventual decision. In this paper it is shown that and how these characteristics can be accommodated within a still recognizably Bayesian account of rational agency.
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267102002079
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Knowledge and Practical Reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101–118.
Knowledge and Practical Reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101-118.
Probabilistic Argumentation.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - Journal of Applied Logic 7 (2):155-176.

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