Future-Bias and Practical Reason

Philosophers' Imprint 15 (2015)
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Abstract

Nearly everyone prefers pain to be in the past rather than the future. This seems like a rationally permissible preference. But I argue that appearances are misleading, and that future-biased preferences are in fact irrational. My argument appeals to trade-offs between hedonic experiences and other goods. I argue that we are rationally required to adopt an exchange rate between a hedonic experience and another type of good that stays fixed, regardless of whether the hedonic experience is in the past or future

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Tom Dougherty
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.

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