Inductive risk and values in science

Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579 (2000)
Abstract
Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results
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DOI 10.1086/392855
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In Defence of the Value Free Ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.
State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science.Justin Biddle - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
Bias and Values in Scientific Research.Torsten Wilholt - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (1):92-101.
Values and Uncertainties in Climate Prediction, Revisited.Wendy Parker - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:24-30.

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