Inductive risk and values in science

Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579 (2000)
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Abstract

Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results

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Heather Douglas
Michigan State University

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References found in this work

The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-246.
On the Seriousness of Mistakes.Isaac Levi - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):47-65.
Statistics, Pragmatics, Induction.C. West Churchman - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (3):249-268.
Science and Decision Making.C. West Churchman - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):247-249.

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