Locke and Mind-Body Dualism

Philosophy 45 (172):87 - 105 (1970)

Abstract
The word ‘dualism’ can be used to pick out at least four different theories concerning the relationship between mind and body. A mind and a body are two different entities and each is “had” by a man. A man is thus a composite being with two components, one “inner”, the other “outer”. You, for example, are a man and your mind is “inner” in the sense that you alone can reflectively experience yourself thinking, or feeling pain, or seeing colours . I can in a sense observe you thinking, but only by observing you use your body in certain ways—e.g. to make certain sounds, write certain things, look at the pages of an open book and frown. My “experience” of you thinking is thus not a reflective experience. Your body is “outer”, on the other hand, in the sense that you cannot experience it or its properties in any exclusive way. That is, in whatever sense you can be said to experience your body, someone else can equally be said to experience it
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819100009761
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,685
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Locke, Metaphysical Dualism and Property Dualism1.José Luis Bermúdez - 1996 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2):223-245.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-10

Total views
44 ( #200,247 of 2,280,831 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #416,015 of 2,280,831 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature