Lewis on fallible knowledge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):573 – 580 (2005)

Authors
Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
Lewis has offered a contextualist epistemology that he claims is non-fallibilist. The present note aims to show that, while there seems to be a simple argument for Lewis's claim, the argument is fallacious, and Lewis's epistemology is fallibilist after all.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400500338963
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,054
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Contextualism and Skepticism.Richard Feldman - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):91-114.
A Skeptic's Reply to Lewisian Contextualism.I. T. Oakley - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):309-332.
Lewis, the Lottery and the Preface.John Hawthorne - 2002 - Analysis 62 (3):242–251.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.
Lewis on Iterated Knowledge.Bernhard Salow - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1571-1590.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Argument From Desire.Robert Holyer - 1988 - Faith and Philosophy 5 (1):61-71.
A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):65 - 82.
The Puzzle of Fallible Knowledge.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (3):325–344.
How to Be a Pragmatist: C. I. Lewis and Humean Skepticism.John Greco - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):24-31.
As Good as It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction.Richard Hanley - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):112 – 128.
Mechanism: A Rejoinder.John R. Lucas - 1970 - Philosophy 45 (April):149-51.
Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):603-619.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
57 ( #126,056 of 2,319,875 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #283,624 of 2,319,875 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature