Oxford University Press (1996)

Abstract
Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed.
Keywords Belief  Choice  Ethics  Free Will  Freedom  Goodness  Metaphilosophy  Morality  Subjectivism
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Reprint years 1997
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Call number BJ1468.5.D68 1996
ISBN(s) 0195107624   9780195107623
DOI 10.2307/2653575
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.
More Work for Hard Incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.

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Misdirection on the Free Will Problem.Richard Double - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.
The Non-Reality of Free Will.Richard Double - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
How Rational Must Free Will Be?Richard Double - 1992 - Metaphilosophy 23 (3):268-78.
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Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism.Tim Bayne - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.

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