Nagel's argument that mental properties are nonphysical

One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism is criticized. The principal criticisms are: Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical
Keywords Mental  Metaphysics  Panpsychism  Physical  Nagel, T
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DOI 10.5840/pra1983923
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