On Bradley's preservation condition for conditionals

Erkenntnis 67 (1):111 - 118 (2007)

Authors
Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.
Keywords Conditionals  Bradley  Adams’s Thesis  Pragmatics
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-007-9043-4
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References found in this work BETA

What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Pragmatics.Stephen C. Levinson - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (1):123-127.
Generalizing the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.

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Citations of this work BETA

Against Preservation.Matthew Mandelkern & Justin Khoo - forthcoming - Analysis:any051.

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