Erkenntnis 67 (1):111 - 118 (2007)
Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.
|Keywords||Conditionals Bradley Adams’s Thesis Pragmatics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic.Ernest W. Adams - 1975 - D. Reidel Pub. Co..
Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief.Colin Howson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century Vol. 2: The Age of Meaning.Scott Soames - 2003 - Princeton University Press.
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