Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):413-427 (2013)

Authors
Tom Dougherty
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival of each stranger for its own sake. Secondly, you are rationally required to achieve as many of these ends as possible, if you have these ends
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.12047
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Defense of Abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.
Should the Numbers Count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.
Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.
Fairness.John Broome - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:87 - 101.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Deontic Constraints Are Maximizing Rules.Matthew Hammerton - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (4):571-588.
The Hard Problem of the Many.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):449-468.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities.Rob Lawlor - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):149 - 166.
The Mixed Solution to the Number Problem.Martin Peterson - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):166-177.
What Punishment for the Murder of 10,000?Michael Davis - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (2):101-118.
Consequentialism and Commitment.Alastair Norcross - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):380–403.
Why Torture is Wrong.Bob Brecher - 2012 - In Contemporary Debates on Terrorism. London: Routledge. pp. 159-165.
The Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of Reasons.Veronique Munoz-Darde - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):207–233.
Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella.Jennie Louise - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536.
Rational Causation.Eric Marcus - 2012 - Harvard University Press.
Rules and Their Reasons: Mill on Morality and Instrumental Rationality.Ben Eggleston - 2011 - In Ben Eggleston, Dale E. Miller & David Weinstein (eds.), John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-93.
Consequentializing Moral Theories.Douglas W. Portmore - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):39–73.
Scientific Explanation.Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon (eds.) - 1962 - Univ of Minnesota Pr.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-06-19

Total views
457 ( #17,142 of 2,446,306 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #18,359 of 2,446,306 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes