Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):435-438 (1984)

John searle has recently claimed to have dissolved what daniel dennett calls 'hume's problem'--The question whether the explanation of behavior by appeal to mental representations can be done without circularity or infinite regress. Searle argues that a careful analysis of the concept of an intentional state shows that mental representations do not require intentional "homunculi" to explain how intentional states have their contents, And, Hence dennett's worry is groundless. I argue that searle's conceptual analysis of intentional states, Even if correct, Provides no clue of an answer to the worry underlying hume's problem
Keywords Epistemology  Intentionality  Searle, J
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1984.tb00359.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.

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Citations of this work BETA

Against Naive Mentalism.Hugh T. Wilder - 1991 - Metaphilosophy (October) 281 (October):281-291.
Against Naive Mentalism.Hugh Wilder - 1991 - Metaphilosophy 22 (4):281-291.

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