State of the Field: Why novel prediction matters


Authors
P. D. Magnus
State University of New York, Albany
Heather Douglas
Michigan State University
Abstract
There is considerable disagreement about the epistemic value of novel predictive success, i.e. when a scientist predicts an unexpected phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the prediction proves to be accurate. We survey the field on this question, noting both fully articulated views such as weak and strong predictivism, and more nascent views, such as pluralist reasons for the instrumental value of prediction. By examining the various reasons offered for the value of prediction across a range of inferential contexts , we can see that neither weak nor strong predictivism captures all of the reasons for valuing prediction available. A third path is presented, Pluralist Instrumental Predictivism; PIP for short
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.04.001
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References found in this work BETA

Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah G. Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Saving the Phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.

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Citations of this work BETA

What’s so Bad About Scientism?Moti Mizrahi - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (4):351-367.
Predictivism and Old Evidence: A Critical Look at Climate Model Tuning.Mathias Frisch - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):171-190.
Epistemic Justification and Methodological Luck in Inflationary Cosmology.C. D. McCoy - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy014.
Predictive Success and Non-Individualist Models in Social Science.Richard Lauer - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):145-161.

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