The ethical advantages of free will subjectivism

Abstract
Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories
Keywords Ethics  Free Will  Freedom  Morality  Subjectivism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00402.x
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References found in this work BETA
Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics.William K. Frankena - 1963 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
From Morality to Virtue.Michael A. Slote - 1992 - Oxford University Press.

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