Abstract
Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.
Keywords Ethics  Free Will  Freedom  Morality  Subjectivism
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr200469289
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References found in this work BETA

Utilitarianism: For and Against.J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams - 1973 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Ethics.William K. Frankena - 1963 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

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