The evidential support theory of conditionals

Synthese 164 (1):19-44 (2008)
Abstract
According to so-called epistemic theories of conditionals, the assertability/acceptability/acceptance of a conditional requires the existence of an epistemically significant relation between the conditional’s antecedent and its consequent. This paper points to some linguistic data that our current best theories of the foregoing type appear unable to explain. Further, it presents a new theory of the same type that does not have that shortcoming. The theory is then defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
Keywords Conditionals  Probability  Semantics  Bayesian epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9214-5
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References found in this work BETA
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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Citations of this work BETA
Learning Conditional Information.Igor Douven - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):239-263.

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