Philo 5 (2):226-234 (2002)

Abstract
The following is a criticism designed to apply to most libertarian free will theorists. I argue that most libertarians hold three beliefs that jointly show them to be unsympathetic or hard-hearted to persons whom they hold morally responsible: that persons are morally responsible only because they make libertarian choices, that we should hold persons responsible, and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make such choices. Softhearted persons who held these three beliefs would espouse hard determinism, which exonerates all persons of moral responsibility, or, at least, would not espouse libertarianism. I do not address the view held by some libertarians that we do have epistemic justification for thinking that persons make libertarian choices, a minority position that I believe cannot be sustained.
Keywords Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/philo20025214
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Citations of this work BETA

Free Will, Punishment, and the Burden of Proof.Michael Louis Corrado - 2018 - Criminal Justice Ethics 37 (1):55-71.
The Hard-Heartedness of Some Libertarians.Richard Double - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:313-318.
Hard-Heartedness and Libertarianism Again.John Lemos - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:319-323.

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