Cognition 142:299-311 (2015)
There is an ongoing controversy in philosophy about the connection between explanation and inference. According to Bayesians, explanatory considerations should be given weight in determining which inferences to make, if at all, only insofar as doing so is compatible with Strict Conditionalization. Explanationists, on the other hand, hold that explanatory considerations can be relevant to the question of how much confidence to invest in our hypotheses in ways which violate Strict Conditionalization. The controversy has focused on normative issues. This paper investigates experimentally the descriptive question of whether judgments of the explanatory goodness of hypotheses do play a role when people revise their degrees of belief in those hypotheses upon the receipt of new evidence. We present the results of three experiments that together strongly support the predictive superiority of the explanationist position
|Keywords||explanatory reasoning updating probability|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Functional Explanation and the Function of Explanation.T. Lombrozo & S. Carey - 2006 - Cognition 99 (2):167-204.
Uncertainty and the de Finetti Tables.Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):308-328.
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Citations of this work BETA
Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent.Nevin Climenhaga - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (5):251-273.
Explanatory Preferences Shape Learning and Inference.Tania Lombrozo - forthcoming - Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation.Matteo Colombo - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (2):503-517.
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