The role of explanatory considerations in updating

Cognition 142:299-311 (2015)
There is an ongoing controversy in philosophy about the connection between explanation and inference. According to Bayesians, explanatory considerations should be given weight in determining which inferences to make, if at all, only insofar as doing so is compatible with Strict Conditionalization. Explanationists, on the other hand, hold that explanatory considerations can be relevant to the question of how much confidence to invest in our hypotheses in ways which violate Strict Conditionalization. The controversy has focused on normative issues. This paper investigates experimentally the descriptive question of whether judgments of the explanatory goodness of hypotheses do play a role when people revise their degrees of belief in those hypotheses upon the receipt of new evidence. We present the results of three experiments that together strongly support the predictive superiority of the explanationist position
Keywords explanatory reasoning  updating  probability
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DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.017
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References found in this work BETA
Free-Energy and the Brain.Karl J. Friston & Klaas E. Stephan - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):417 - 458.
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Citations of this work BETA
Credal Pragmatism.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent.Nevin Climenhaga - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (5):251-273.
Explanatory Preferences Shape Learning and Inference.Tania Lombrozo - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (10):748-759.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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