Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806 (2013)

Authors
Heather Douglas
Michigan State University
Abstract
Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships. This allows us to clarify why these values are central to science and what role they should play, while reducing the tensions among them
Keywords Values in Science  Scientific Inference  Epistemic Values
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Reprint years 2012, 2013
DOI 10.1086/673716
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New Direction for Science and Values.Daniel J. Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
Systematizing the Theoretical Virtues.Michael Keas - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2761-2793.

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