Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806 (2013)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships. This allows us to clarify why these values are central to science and what role they should play, while reducing the tensions among them
|
Keywords | Values in Science Scientific Inference Epistemic Values Theoretical Virtues |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2012, 2013 |
DOI | 10.1086/673716 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1977 - In The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press. pp. 320--39.
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.Pierre Duhem & Philip P. Wiener - 1955 - Science and Society 19 (1):85-87.
How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less A D Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.Malcolm R. Forster & Elliott Sober - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.
Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
View all 12 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Bayesian Philosophy of Science: Variations on a Theme by the Reverend Thomas Bayes.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-Engineering.Georg Brun - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1211-1241.
Conceptual Re-Engineering: From Explication to Reflective Equilibrium.Georg Brun - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):925-954.
Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1061-1081.
View all 62 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models.Sven Diekmann & Martin Peterson - 2013 - Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):207-218.
Assessing the Role of Non-Epistemic Feminist Values in Scientific Inquiry.William A. Rottschaefer - 2003 - Behavior and Philosophy 31:225 - 249.
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science.Wenceslao J. González - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 96 (1):85-112.
The Role of Cognitive Values in the Shaping of Scientific Rationality.Jan Faye - 2008 - In Evandro Agazzi (ed.), Science and Ethics. The Axiological Contexts of Science. (Series: Philosophy and Politics. Vol. 14. Vienna: P.I.E. Peter Lang. pp. 125-140.
Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science.Kevin C. Elliott & David Willmes - unknown - Philosophy of Science (5):807-817.
On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?Phyllis Rooney - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:13-22.
The Dynamics of Scientific Concepts: The Relevance of Epistemic Aims and Values.Ingo Brigandt - 2012 - In Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. Berlin: de Gruyter. pp. 75–103.
Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science.Kevin C. Elliott - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (2):303-324.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2012-07-05
Total views
238 ( #46,547 of 2,504,868 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #74,337 of 2,504,868 )
2012-07-05
Total views
238 ( #46,547 of 2,504,868 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #74,337 of 2,504,868 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads