What Might Not Be Nonsense

Philosophy 68 (266):549 - 557 (1993)
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Abstract

For Wittgenstein, as Cora Diamond interprets him in the essays collected in her recent The Realistic Spirit , there are no logical truths, and a host of other linguistic constructions, such as ‘A is an object’ are, contrary to appearances, nonsensical. In what follows, after outlining Diamond's account I argue that the position she ascribes to Wittgenstein is incoherent. I also reject some possible responses to this charge, among them an appeal to the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown.

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References found in this work

Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
On concept and object.Gottlob Frege - 1951 - Mind 60 (238):168-180.
Logic and Knowledge.BERTRAND RUSSELL - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 7 (29):374.
The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind.Cora DIAMOND - 1991 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 100 (4):577-577.
What Nonsense Might Be.Cora Diamond - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (215):5 - 22.

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