Daniel Doviak
Muhlenberg College
In this dissertation, I use virtue theory to answer a number of different questions in the normative ethics of behavior and in welfare axiology. In chapter 1, I provide an introduction to the Normative Ethics of Behavior. I present some of the conceptual background necessary for answering the question "What makes right actions right?" In chapter 2, I provide critical summaries of some of the most popular virtue-ethical theories of right action. In chapter 3, I present and defend my own virtue-ethical theory of right action and show why this rather simple theory is not vulnerable to any of the objections that challenge its virtue-ethical rivals. In chapter 4, I turn to the question of how to measure the extent to which a person acts justly in the performance of an action. I argue that there are at least four variables that determine how just a person's action is at a time. I try to show how we can integrate these four variables into a single measure for just action. In chapter 5, I consider whether being just is intrinsically, prudentially rewarding. Most modern philosophers answer: no, at least not as a matter of necessity. In a recent and influential paper, Wayne Sumner disagrees with this popular position. I rehearse and criticize his arguments. In chapter 6, I offer a new argument for Sumner's conclusion, one that avoids the problems that his own argument faces. My argument turns on the fact that a just person's own moral virtue will make a distributional claim on her that she is bound to satisfy in a way that will enhance her welfare
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,132
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Joel A. Martinez - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):277-288.
Cultivating Practical Wisdom.Jason Swartwood - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
Well -Being and Actual Desires.Mark E. Lukas - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Virtue Theory and Applied Ethics.Liezi van Zyl - 2002 - South African Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):133-143.
Aristotle and the Environment.Susanne E. Foster - 2002 - Environmental Ethics 24 (4):409-428.
Was Kant a Virtue Ethicist?Robert N. Johnson - 2008 - In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. De Gruyter. pp. 61-76.
A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.Daniel Doviak - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):259-272.
Accidental Rightness.Liezl van Zyl - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):91-104.
How to Think About Virtue and Right.Valerie Tiberius - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (2):247-265.


Added to PP index

Total views
14 ( #712,296 of 2,454,690 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,768 of 2,454,690 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes